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Abstract 
This appendix serves as a supplement to “Cost Pass-through in Commercial Aviation: Theory and 
Evidence.” In this appendix we present the computational details of the theoretical model as well 
as the model predictions described in the text of the above-mentioned paper. Using a model of air 
travel demand and supply for an origin-destination market, we derive the closed-form expression 
for Nash equilibrium airfares, and use the closed-form expression to perform a series of 
comparative statics exercises. In particular, crucial expressions for obtaining predictions in Table 
1 and Table 2 in the paper (Gayle and Lin, 2020) are provided.  
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A. Obtaining a Closed-form Solution for Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium Airfares   
In this section, we provide the computational details of obtaining the Nash equilibrium for 
the system of air travel demand and supply equations presented in the theory section of the paper 
(Gayle and Lin, 2020). As described in Section 2.2, we assume airlines are competing 
simultaneously and non-cooperatively in a Bertrand-Nash price-setting game, and the Nash 
equilibrium is a set of prices that solve the following first-order conditions:  
[  
 2𝛽 −𝛽 ⋯ −𝛽−𝛽 2𝛽 … −𝛽⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮−𝛽 −𝛽 ⋯ 2𝛽]  
 × [𝑃1𝑃2⋮𝑃𝑛] − [
𝐻1 + 𝛽𝑐1𝐻2 + 𝛽𝑐2⋮𝐻𝑛 + 𝛽𝑐𝑛] = [
00⋮0]    (A-1) 
which can be rewritten as follows: 
𝐵 × [𝑃1𝑃2⋮𝑃𝑛] − [
𝐻1 + 𝛽𝑐1𝐻2 + 𝛽𝑐2⋮𝐻𝑛 + 𝛽𝑐𝑛] = [
00⋮0]    (A-2) 
where  
𝐵 = [  
 2𝛽 −𝛽 ⋯ −𝛽−?̃? 2𝛽 … −𝛽⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮−?̃? −𝛽 ⋯ 2𝛽]  
 
     (A-3) 
Following the approach illustrated in Wang and Zhao (2007), let 𝐵 = 1𝑎 [𝐼 − 𝑏𝑇], where 𝑎 = 12𝛽+?̃? ; 𝑏 = 𝑎𝛽 = ?̃?2𝛽+?̃?; 𝐼 is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 identity matrix; and 𝑇 is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix of ones. The 
inverse of matrix B is given by:  𝐵−1 = 𝑎 [𝐼 + 𝑏1−𝑛𝑏𝑇]     (A-4) 
We focus on a Nash Equilibrium in which products have strictly positive prices (𝑃𝑖 > 0) 
and production levels (𝑞𝑖 > 0) . The system of first-order conditions yields the following 
expression for Nash equilibrium price levels: 
[𝑃1𝑃2⋮𝑃𝑛] = 𝐵−1 [
𝐻1 + 𝛽𝑐1𝐻2 + 𝛽𝑐2⋮𝐻𝑛 + 𝛽𝑐𝑛] = [   
  𝑎 + 𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏 𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏 ⋯ 𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏 … 𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏 𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏 ⋯ 𝑎 + 𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏]   
  [𝐻1 + 𝛽𝑐1𝐻2 + 𝛽𝑐2⋮𝐻3 + 𝛽𝑐𝑛]     (A-5) 
For any air travel product 𝑖 in equation system (A-5), the optimal airfare 𝑃𝑖 is given by: 
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𝑃𝑖 = (𝑎 + 𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏)𝐻𝑖 + 𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏∑ 𝐻𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖 + (𝑎 + 𝑎𝑏1−𝑛𝑏)𝛽𝑐𝑖 + 𝑎𝑏𝛽1−𝑛𝑏 ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖    (A-6) 
Substituting = 12𝛽+?̃? , 𝑏 = ?̃?2𝛽+?̃? into equation (A-6), we obtain the Nash equilibrium expression 
for prices as shown in equation (7) in the paper (Gayle and Lin, 2020), given by: 𝑃𝑖 = 2𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝐻𝑖 + ?̃?(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?] (∑ 𝐻𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖 ) +  𝛽[2𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?](2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?] 𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽?̃?(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?] (∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖 )       (A-7) 
Furthermore, substituting the specifications for 𝐻𝑖 and 𝑐𝑖 into equation (A-7) yields the following 
reduced-form equation for Nash equilibrium price for air travel product 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛: 𝑷𝒊∗ = 𝒇(𝛉; 𝑃𝑐 , 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 , 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡, 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝐷𝑖𝑐, 𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑋1, 𝑋2𝑖, 𝑋−2𝑖, 𝑍1, 𝑍2𝑖) 
= ℎ0+ℎ1𝑋1+𝛽𝛼0+𝛽𝛼1𝑍12𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃ + { ℎ2𝑋2𝑖+ℎ3𝑋−2𝑖+(𝛾1𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡+𝛾2𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡2)𝛿0𝐷𝑖+𝛽𝛼2𝑍2𝑖+𝛽𝜙0(𝑎0+𝑎1𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖)+𝛽𝜙0𝐷𝑖𝑐+𝛽𝜙0𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖}2𝛽+𝛽 ̃ +
{  
  ?̃? ∑ (ℎ2𝑋2𝑗+ℎ3𝑋−2𝑗+𝛽𝛼2𝑍2𝑗+𝛽𝜙0(𝑎0+𝑎1𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐽)+𝛽𝜙0𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗)𝑛𝑗=1 +?̃?[𝛿0ℎ4(𝛾1𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡+𝛾2𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡2)+𝛽𝜙0𝛼4]𝑛0+?̃?[𝛿0ℎ5(𝛾1𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡+𝛾2𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡2)+𝛽𝜙0𝛼5]𝑛1+?̃?[𝛿0ℎ6(𝛾1𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡+𝛾2𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡2)+𝛽𝜙0𝛼6]𝑛2 }  
  
(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃ )[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃] +{?̃?(ℎ4𝑛0+ℎ5𝑛1+ℎ6𝑛2)+[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃]𝐷𝑖(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃ )[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃ ] (𝛾1𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡2)𝛿1 +?̃?(𝛼4𝑛0+𝛼5𝑛1+𝛼6𝑛2)+[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃ ](𝐷𝑖𝑐+(𝑎0+𝑎1𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖)+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)+𝛽 ̃∑ ((𝑎0+𝑎1𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝐽)+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗)𝑛𝑗=1(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃ ] 𝛽𝜙1} 𝑃𝑐
                          (A-8) 
where 𝑛0 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖0𝑛𝑖=1            (A-9) 𝑛1 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖1𝑛𝑖=1       (A-10) 𝑛2 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1       (A-11) 𝑋−2𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋2𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖      (A-12) 𝛉 ≡ {𝛽0, 𝛽, ℎ0, ℎ1, ℎ2, ℎ3, ℎ4, ℎ5, ℎ6, 𝛾1, 𝛾2, 𝛿0, 𝛿1, 𝛼0, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝑎0, 𝑎1, 𝛼4, 𝛼5, 𝛼6, 𝛼7, 𝜙0, 𝜙1}  (A-13) 
 
The assumption of strictly positive prices and quantities implies that 2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 > 0. 
Implications of the assumption of strictly positive prices and quantities are summarized in Lemma 
1.  
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Lemma 1: The assumption of positive prices and quantities for each product 𝑖 = 1,2 , … , 𝑛 in 
Nash equilibrium, implies that the following inequalities hold simultaneously: 
{  
  𝑃𝑖∗ > 0𝑞𝑖∗ > 0𝐻𝑖 > 𝑐𝑖 > 0𝛽 > 𝛽 > 0 ⇒ {  
  2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 > 0∑ 𝐻𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 + [(𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃ − 𝛽]∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 > 0𝐻𝑖 > 𝑐𝑖 > 0𝛽 > 𝛽 > 0       (A-14) 
 
Illustration of Inequalities Suggested in Lemma 1: 
Assuming positive price and quantity for each product, we first compute the Nash 
equilibrium quantity by substituting the equilibrium price into demand function, which gives: 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝛽2𝛽+?̃? [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝐻𝑖−(𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝑐𝑖+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?    (A-15) 
Strictly positive prices and quantities imply the following inequalities: 
{ 
 𝑃𝑖∗ > 0𝑞𝑖∗ > 0𝐻𝑖 > 𝑐𝑖 > 0𝛽 > 𝛽 > 0 ⇒ {  
  [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?](𝐻𝑖+𝛽𝑐𝑖)+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 12𝛽+?̃?) > 0[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝐻𝑖−(𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝑐𝑖+?̃?∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 𝛽2𝛽+?̃?) > 0𝐻𝑖 > 𝑐𝑖 > 0𝛽 > 𝛽 > 0  (A-16) 
For each 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, their positive Nash equilibrium prices imply: 
If 
{   
   𝑃1∗ = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?](𝐻1+𝛽𝑐1)+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 12𝛽+?̃?) > 0𝑃2∗ = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?](𝐻2+𝛽𝑐2)+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 12𝛽+?̃?) > 0⁞𝑃𝑛∗ = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?](𝐻𝑛+𝛽𝑐𝑛)+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 12𝛽+?̃?) > 0
 , then 𝑃1∗ + 𝑃2∗ +⋯+ 𝑃𝑛∗ > 0  
That is: 𝑃1∗ + 𝑃2∗ +⋯+ 𝑃𝑛∗ = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?](𝐻1+𝛽𝑐1)+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=1(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?] + [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?](𝐻2+𝛽𝑐2)+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=1(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?] +⋯+ [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?](𝐻𝑛+𝛽𝑐𝑛)+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=1(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?] = ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? > 0      (A-17) 
Given 𝐻𝑖 > 𝑐𝑖 > 0 ∀𝑖 and 𝛽 > 0, 𝐻𝑗 + 𝛽𝑐𝑗 > 0 ∀𝑖, therefore, 2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 > 0. 
For each 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛, their positive Nash equilibrium quantities imply: 
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If 
{   
   𝑞1∗ = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝐻1−(𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝑐1+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 𝛽2𝛽+?̃?) > 0𝑞2∗ = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝐻2−(𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝑐2+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 𝛽2𝛽+?̃?) > 0⁞𝑞𝑛∗ = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝐻𝑛−(𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝑐𝑛+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 𝛽2𝛽+?̃?) > 0
 , then 𝑞1∗ + 𝑞2∗ +⋯+ 𝑞𝑛∗ > 0  
That is: 𝑞1∗ + 𝑞2∗ +⋯+ 𝑞𝑛∗ = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝐻1−(𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝑐1+?̃?∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 𝛽2𝛽+?̃?) +[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝐻2−(𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝑐2+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 𝛽2𝛽+?̃?) + ⋯+[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝐻𝑛−(𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝑐𝑛+?̃? ∑ (𝐻𝑗+𝛽𝑐𝑗)𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? ( 𝛽2𝛽+?̃?) = ∑ 𝐻𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 +[(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃−𝛽]∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑛𝑗=12𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃? 𝛽 > 0   (A-18) 
Given 2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 > 0  from the positive prices constraint, the positive quantities 
suggest ∑ 𝐻𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 + [(𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃ − 𝛽]∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 > 0. Therefore, the assumption of strictly positive 
Nash equilibrium prices and quantities imply the inequalities in (A-14).  
 
B. Model Predictions 
In this section, we derive the crude oil-airfare pass-through relationship represented by 
the partial derivative of Nash equilibrium airfares in equation (A-8) with respect to crude oil price, 
and on the basis of which, we further conduct comparative statics analysis that facilitates the 
derivation of several propositions summarized and presented in Table 1 and Table 2 in the paper 
(Gayle and Lin, 2020).  
 
Proposition 1 (Prediction #1 in Table 1 in the paper (Gayle and Lin, 2020)): crude oil-airfare 
pass-through relationship  
The pass-through rate of airfare to changes in crude oil price level is defined as the 
marginal effect of crude oil price on the Nash equilibrium airfares of equation (A-8) and derived 
by taking partial derivative of 𝑃𝑖∗ with respect to 𝑃𝑐 as shown in equation (13) in the paper (Gayle 
and Lin, 2020): 𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄   = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃ ]𝐷𝑖+?̃? ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑖=1(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃] 𝛾𝛿1 +[2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ](𝛼3𝑖+𝐷𝑖𝑐+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)+?̃?𝛼−3𝑖+?̃? ∑ (𝐷𝑗𝑐+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗)𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃] 𝛽𝜙1     (B-1) 
6 
 
where  ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 = ℎ4𝑛0 + ℎ5𝑛1 + ℎ6𝑛2    (B-2) 𝛼−3𝑖 = ∑ 𝛼3𝑗𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖       (B-3) 
Therefore, the pass-through rate of crude oil price to airfare is represented by equation 
(B-1), with which we derive the conditions for which the hedging parameters, 𝛼3𝑖  and 𝛼−3𝑖 , 
determine the sign of the crude oil-airfare pass-through. Holding everything else constant, we 
next compute the threshold conditions for 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 such that airline 𝑖’s pass-through rate is 
zero, i.e. 𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄 = 0.  
The 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 that satisfy the zero pass-through are determined by the following: [2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃]𝛼3𝑖∗ + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖∗ =
− 1𝜙1𝛽{[2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃](𝛾𝛿1𝐷𝑖 + 𝜙1𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑐 + 𝜙1𝛽𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)+𝛾𝛿1𝛽(ℎ4𝑛0 + ℎ5𝑛1 + ℎ6𝑛2) + 𝜙1𝛽𝛽(𝛼4𝑛0 + 𝛼5𝑛1 + 𝛼6𝑛2)+𝜙1𝛽𝛽𝛼7∑ 𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 }                    (B-4) 
 
Define Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ , 𝛼−3𝑖∗ ) ≡ [2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃]𝛼3𝑖∗ + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖∗ . According to Lemma 1, 2𝛽 −(𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃ > 0, and all other parameters in the right-hand side of equation (B-4) are positive, 
therefore, Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ , 𝛼−3𝑖∗ ) < 0. It is straightforward to conclude:  
(i) ∀𝑖 and values of 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 such that [2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃]𝛼3𝑖 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖 > Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ , 𝛼−3𝑖∗ ), 
yield 𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 > 0; 
(ii) ∀𝑖  and values of 𝛼3𝑖  and 𝛼−3𝑖  such that [2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃]𝛼3𝑖 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖 <Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ , 𝛼−3𝑖∗ ), yield 𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0. 
The above derived conditions for 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 determine the sign of the crude oil-airfare 
pass-through relationship, which we summarize in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: The pass-through from crude oil price on an airline’s optimal airfare can be either 
positive or negative, depending on the airline’s and its rival airlines’ fuel hedging strategies. 
Specifically, 
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(i)  𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄 < 0 when airline 𝑖 engages in jet fuel hedging contracts such that the associated 
hedging parameter, 𝛼3𝑖, satisfies: 𝛼3𝑖 < Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃  ∀𝑖; 
(ii)  𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄 > 0 when airline 𝑖 commits no or little jet fuel hedging such that the associated 
hedging parameter, 𝛼3𝑖, satisfies: 𝛼3𝑖 > Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃  ∀𝑖; 
where Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ , 𝛼−3𝑖∗ ) ≡ [2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 2)𝛽 ̃]𝛼3𝑖∗ + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖∗ ; and 𝛼3𝑖∗ , 𝛼−3𝑖∗  are the critical values such 
that the derived pass-through rate equals to zero, that is: 
Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ , 𝛼−3𝑖∗ ) = − 1𝜙1𝛽{[2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃](𝛾𝛿1𝐷𝑖 + 𝜙1𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑐 + 𝜙1𝛽𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)+𝛾𝛿1𝛽(ℎ4𝑛0 + ℎ5𝑛1 + ℎ6𝑛2) + 𝜙1𝛽𝛽(𝛼4𝑛0 + 𝛼5𝑛1 + 𝛼6𝑛2)+𝜙1𝛽𝛽𝛼7∑ 𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 }       
Therefore, 𝛩 identifies a threshold of the market jet fuel hedging adoptions by airlines for making 
the crude oil-airfare pass-through positive or negative.  
 
Proposition 2 (Prediction #2 in Table 1 in the paper (Gayle and Lin, 2020)): the role of 
airline jet fuel hedging  
One of our objectives in the paper (Gayle and Lin, 2020) is to explore the determining roles 
of several product-specific, firm-specific, and market-specific characteristics on the crude oil-
airfare pass-through relationship. Comparative statics analysis facilitates the derivation of such 
predictions. To examine the impact of jet fuel hedging on the sign and magnitude of the pass-
through rate, we take the partial derivative of the pass-through rate defined by equation (B-1) with 
respect to the hedging variable denoted by 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖:  𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐}𝜕𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑖 < 0 = 2𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝑎1𝛽𝜙1     (B-5) 
By Lemma 1, the above partial derivative is always negative, implying a negative 
relationship between the hedging ratio and the pass-through rate. Proposition 2 summarizes the 
model predicted impact of jet fuel hedging on the pass-through rate: 
 
Proposition 2: The pass-through rate from changes in crude oil price to an airline’s optimal fare 
is a decreasing function of its jet fuel hedging ratio, i.e. 𝝏{𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄}𝝏𝑯𝒆𝒅𝒈𝒆𝒊 < 0 ∀𝑖. Specifically,   
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(i) when airline 𝑖’s hedging ratio is at a level such that 𝛼3𝑖 < Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃  ∀𝑖, resulting 
in a negative pass-through, 𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄 < 0, the pass-through rate decreases away from 0 (i.e. 
increasing in magnitude) as the hedging ratio increases; 
(ii) when airline 𝑖 ’s hedging ratio is at a level such that 𝛼3𝑖 > Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃  ∀𝑖 , 
resulting in a positive pass-through, 𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄 > 0, the pass-through rate decreases towards 
0 (i.e. decreasing in magnitude) as the hedging ratio increases. 
 
Proposition 2 can also be illustrated using a simple diagram, Figure B1, as follows: 
 
Figure B1: Relationships between model-derived Pass-through Rate and Fuel Hedging Ratios 
 
 
Figure B1 shows that, as fuel hedging ratio increases, the positive crude oil-airfare pass-
through rate becomes less positive (decrease in absolute value) in Quadrant I. Whereas, the 
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negative crude oil-airfare pass-through rate becomes more negative (increase in absolute value) in 
Quadrant IV.  
 
Proposition 3 (Prediction #3 in Table 1 in the paper (Gayle and Lin, 2020)): the role of 
product itinerary distance  
We take the partial derivative of pass-through equation (B-1) with respect to the air travel 
product’s itinerary distance, denoted by 𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 , to understand the role of a product’s 
actual flying distance in determining the sign and magnitude of crude oil-airfare pass-through: 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐}𝜕𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)𝛽 ̃ ]𝛽𝛼7𝜙1    (B-6) 
By Lemma 1, the above partial derivative is always positive, implying a positive 
relationship between the itinerary travel distance and the pass-through rate. This relationship is 
summarized in Proposition 3: 
 
Proposition 3:  The pass-through rate from changes in crude oil price to optimal airfare is an 
increasing function of the product’s itinerary flying distance, i.e. 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐}𝜕𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 > 0 ∀𝑖 . 
Specifically,  
 (i) when airline 𝑖 ’s hedging ratio is at a level such that 𝛼3𝑖 < Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃  ∀𝑖 , 
resulting in a negative pass-though, 𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄 < 0, the pass-through rate increases towards 
0 (i.e. decreasing in magnitude) as the itinerary flying distance increases; 
(ii) when airline 𝑖 ’s hedging ratio is at a level such that 𝛼3𝑖 > Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃  ∀𝑖 , 
resulting in a positive pass-through, 𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄 > 0, the pass-through rate increases away 
from 0 (i.e. increasing in magnitude) as the itinerary flying distance increases.  
 
Proposition 3 can also be illustrated using a simple diagram, Figure B2, as follows: 
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Figure B2: Relationships between model-derived Pass-through Rate and Itinerary Distance 
 
 
Figure B2 shows that, as a product’s itinerary distance increases, the positive crude oil-
airfare pass-through rate becomes more positive (increase in absolute value) in Quadrant I, 
whereas, the negative crude oil-airfare pass-through rate becomes less negative (decrease in 
absolute value) in Quadrant IV.  
 
Proposition 4 (Prediction #4 in Table 1 in the paper (Gayle and Lin, 2020)): the role of 
market competition  
We take the partial derivative of pass-through equation (B-1) with respect to each of the 
three measures of market competition, 𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, to understand the role of market competition in 
determining the sign and magnitude of crude oil-airfare pass-through: 
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𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛0 = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]ℎ4+?̃?(ℎ4𝑛0+ℎ5𝑛1+ℎ6𝑛2)(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 𝛾𝛽𝛿1⏟                       𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑−𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 (+) +              [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝛼4+?̃?(𝛼4𝑛0+𝛼5𝑛1+𝛼6𝑛2)+?̃?∑ (𝛼3𝑖+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃ )[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 𝛽𝛽𝜙1⏟                                       𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦−𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 (+/−)             (B-7) 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛1 = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]ℎ5+?̃?(ℎ4𝑛0+ℎ5𝑛1+ℎ6𝑛2)(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 𝛾𝛽𝛿1⏟                       𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑−𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 (+) +                [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝛼5+?̃?(𝛼4𝑛0+𝛼5𝑛1+𝛼6𝑛2)+?̃? ∑ (𝛼3𝑖+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃ )[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 𝛽𝛽𝜙1⏟                                       𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦−𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 (+/−)            (B-8) 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛2 = [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]ℎ6+?̃?(ℎ4𝑛0+ℎ5𝑛1+ℎ6𝑛2)(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 𝛾𝛽𝛿1⏟                       𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑−𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 (+) +                [2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]𝛼6+?̃?(𝛼4𝑛0+𝛼5𝑛1+𝛼6𝑛2)+?̃? ∑ (𝛼3𝑖+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1(2𝛽+𝛽 ̃ )[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 𝛽𝛽𝜙1⏟                                       𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦−𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 (+/−)          (B-9) 
To determine the sign of equations (B-7), (B-8), and (B-9), we set them to zero and derive 
conditions for values of 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 such that 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛0 = 0, 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛1 = 0, 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛2 = 0. The conditions 
for values of 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 such that 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛0 = 0, 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛1 = 0, 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛2 = 0 are the following: 
𝛽𝛼3𝑖0 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖0 = − 1𝜙1𝛽{ [2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃](𝛾𝛿1ℎ4 + 𝜙1𝛽𝛼4)+𝛾𝛿1𝛽(ℎ4𝑛0 + ℎ5𝑛1 + ℎ6𝑛2) + 𝜙1𝛽𝛽(𝛼4𝑛0 + 𝛼5𝑛1 + 𝛼6𝑛2)+𝜙1𝛽𝛽𝛼7∑ 𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 }  (B-10) 
𝛽𝛼3𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖1 = − 1𝜙1𝛽{ [2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃](𝛾𝛿1ℎ5 + 𝜙1𝛽𝛼5)+𝛾𝛿1𝛽(ℎ4𝑛0 + ℎ5𝑛1 + ℎ6𝑛2) + 𝜙1𝛽𝛽(𝛼4𝑛0 + 𝛼5𝑛1 + 𝛼6𝑛2)+𝜙1𝛽𝛽𝛼7∑ 𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 }  (B-11) 
𝛽𝛼3𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖2 = − 1𝜙1𝛽{ [2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃](𝛾𝛿1ℎ6 + 𝜙1𝛽𝛼6)+𝛾𝛿1𝛽(ℎ4𝑛0 + ℎ5𝑛1 + ℎ6𝑛2) + 𝜙1𝛽𝛽(𝛼4𝑛0 + 𝛼5𝑛1 + 𝛼6𝑛2)+𝜙1𝛽𝛽𝛼7∑ 𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 }  (B-12) 
Define the following:  Ψ0(𝛼3𝑖0 , 𝛼−3𝑖0 ) ≡ 𝛽𝛼3𝑖0 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖0     (B-13) 
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Ψ1(𝛼3𝑖1 , 𝛼−3𝑖1 ) ≡ 𝛽𝛼3𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖1     (B-14) Ψ2(𝛼3𝑖2 , 𝛼−3𝑖2 ) ≡ 𝛽𝛼3𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖2     (B-15) 
According to Lemma 1, 2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃ > 0, and all other parameters in the right-hand side of 
the above equations (B-10) through (B-12) are positive, therefore, Ψ0(𝛼3𝑖0 , 𝛼−3𝑖0 ) < 0;  Ψ1(𝛼3𝑖1 , 𝛼−3𝑖1 ) < 0;  and Ψ2(𝛼3𝑖2 , 𝛼−3𝑖2 ) < 0 . Therefore, it is straightforward to conclude the 
following: 
(i) ∀𝑖 and values of 𝛼3𝑖and 𝛼−3𝑖 such that 𝛽𝛼3𝑖 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖 < Ψ0(𝛼3𝑖0 , 𝛼−3𝑖0 ), yield 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛0 <0; conversely, ∀𝑖 and values of 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 such that 𝛽𝛼3𝑖 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖 > Ψ0(𝛼3𝑖0 , 𝛼−3𝑖0 ), 
yield 
𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛0 > 0. 
(ii) ∀𝑖 and values of 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 such that 𝛽𝛼3𝑖 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖 < Ψ1(𝛼3𝑖1 , 𝛼−3𝑖1 ), yield 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛1 <0; conversely, ∀𝑖 and values of 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 such that 𝛽𝛼3𝑖 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖 > Ψ1(𝛼3𝑖1 , 𝛼−3𝑖1 ), 
yield 
𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛1 > 0. 
(iii) ∀𝑖  and values of 𝛼3𝑖  and 𝛼−3𝑖  such that 𝛽𝛼3𝑖 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖 < Ψ2(𝛼3𝑖2 , 𝛼−3𝑖2 ) , yield 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛2 < 0 ; conversely, ∀𝑖  and values of 𝛼3𝑖  and 𝛼−3𝑖  such that 𝛽𝛼3𝑖 + 𝛽𝛼−3𝑖 >Ψ2(𝛼3𝑖2 , 𝛼−3𝑖2 ), yield 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛2 > 0. 
 
Given the above relationships along with findings in Proposition 1, Table B1 summarizes 
the impact of market competition on the pass-through rate: 
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Table B1: The Impact of Market Competition on the Pass-through Rate1 
 Outcomes Parameter Restrictions 
𝝏{𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄} 𝝏𝒏𝟎   
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 and 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛0 < 0 (1.1) 𝛼3𝑖 < min {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ0(𝛼3𝑖0 ,𝛼−3𝑖0 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? }  
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 and 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛0 > 0  (1.2) min {Θ(𝛼3𝑖
∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ0(𝛼3𝑖0 ,𝛼−3𝑖0 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? } < 𝛼3𝑖 <max {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ0(𝛼3𝑖0 ,𝛼−3𝑖0 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? }  
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 > 0 and 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛0 > 0  (1.3) 𝛼3𝑖 > max {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ0(𝛼3𝑖0 ,𝛼−3𝑖0 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? }  
𝝏{𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄} 𝝏𝒏𝟏   
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 and 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛1 < 0 (2.1) 𝛼3𝑖 < min {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ1(𝛼3𝑖1 ,𝛼−3𝑖1 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? }  
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 and 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛1 > 0  (2.2) min {Θ(𝛼3𝑖
∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ1(𝛼3𝑖1 ,𝛼−3𝑖1 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? } < 𝛼3𝑖 <max {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ1(𝛼3𝑖1 ,𝛼−3𝑖1 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? }  
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 > 0 and 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛1 > 0  (2.3) 𝛼3𝑖 > max {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ1(𝛼3𝑖1 ,𝛼−3𝑖1 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? }  
𝝏{𝝏𝑷𝒊∗𝝏𝑷𝒄} 𝝏𝒏𝟐   
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 and 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛2 < 0 (3.1) 𝛼3𝑖 < min {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ2(𝛼3𝑖2 ,𝛼−3𝑖2 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? }  
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 and 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛2 > 0  (3.2) min {Θ(𝛼3𝑖
∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ2(𝛼3𝑖2 ,𝛼−3𝑖2 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? } < 𝛼3𝑖 <max {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ2(𝛼3𝑖2 ,𝛼−3𝑖2 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? }  
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 > 0 and 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛2 > 0  (3.3) 𝛼3𝑖 > max {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ ,Ψ2(𝛼3𝑖2 ,𝛼−3𝑖2 )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖?̃? }  
 
From Table B1, (𝛼3𝑖0 , 𝛼−3𝑖0 ), (𝛼3𝑖1 , 𝛼−3𝑖1 ), (𝛼3𝑖2 , 𝛼−3𝑖2 ) represent the critical values such that 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛0 =0, 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛1 = 0, 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛2 = 0, respectively. Therefore, Ψ0(𝛼3𝑖0 , 𝛼−3𝑖0 ),Ψ1(𝛼3𝑖1 , 𝛼−3𝑖1 ) and Ψ2(𝛼3𝑖2 , 𝛼−3𝑖2 ) 
identify the thresholds of fuel hedging adoptions by airlines that determines whether the marginal 
impact of market competition intensity on the crude oil-airfare pass-through rate is positive or 
                                                     
1
 For conditions (1.2), (2.2) and (3.2), we find the signs of  𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 and its partial derivatives with respect to 𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, 
respectively, are opposite with two possibilities; however, assuming the pass-through equation to be a continuous and 
differentiable function with respect to 𝑛0, 𝑛1, 𝑛2, the only possibility is 𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 and the relevant partial derivatives are 
positive, as shown in the table.  
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negative. Guided by parameter restrictions and associated outcomes reported in Table B1, we 
summarize the impact of market competition on the pass-through rate in Proposition 4: 
 
Proposition 4:  The pass-through from changes in crude oil price to an air travel product’s 
equilibrium airfare can be positively or negatively influenced by the intensity of market 
competition, depending on the airline’s and its rival airlines’ fuel hedging strategies:  
(i) when airline 𝑖’s hedging ratio is at a level satisfying parameter restrictions (1.1), (2.1), 
or (3.1) in Table B1, there is a negative pass-though; and the negative pass-through 
rate decreases away from 0 (i.e. increasing in magnitude) with the number of 
competing products that have the same number of intermediate stops offered in the 
market. The total effect is negative with the supply-side effect being negative and 
dominating the positive demand-side effect.  
(ii) when airline 𝑖’s hedging ratio is at a level satisfying parameter restrictions (1.2), (2.2), 
or (3.2) in Table B1, there is a negative pass-through; and the negative pass-through 
rate increases towards 0 (i.e. decreasing in magnitude) with the number of competing 
products that have the same number of intermediate stops offered in the market. The 
total effect is positive.  
(iii) when airline 𝑖’s hedging ratio is at a level satisfying parameter restrictions (1.3), (2.3), 
or (3.3) in Table B1, there is a positive pass-through; and the positive pass-through 
rate increases away from 0 (i.e. increasing in magnitude) with the number of competing 
products that have the same number of intermediate stops offered in the market. The 
total effect is positive.   
 
Using 
𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛0  in equation (B-7) as an example, the impact of market competition measured 
by 𝑛0 on the pass-through in Proposition 4 can be illustrated using a simple diagram, Figure B3, 
as follows: 
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Figure B3: Relationships between model-derived Pass-through Rate and Market Competitiveness 
 
Figure B3 shows that, there is a non-linear relationship between the level of market 
competition measured by the total number of non-stop products competing in an origin-destination 
market and the pass-through rate, depending on airlines’ adoption of fuel hedging strategies. The 
above non-linear relationship also applies to 
𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛1  and 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖
∗𝜕𝑃𝑐} 𝜕𝑛2 . The relationship between the crude 
oil-airfare pass-through and market competition illustrated above implies that an additional air 
travel product offered in the market can have either an upward or a downward pressure on the air 
travel product’s pass-through rate, depending on airlines’ hedging ratios, ceteris paribus. 
 
Proposition 5 (Table 2 in the paper (Gayle and Lin, 2020)): the role of origin-destination 
market distance  
We take the partial derivative of pass-through equation (B-1) with respect to the origin-
destination market distance denoted by 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡, to understand the role of market distance in 
determining the sign and magnitude of crude oil-airfare pass-through: 
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𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐}𝜕𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 = ( ℎ4𝑛0+ℎ5𝑛1+ℎ6𝑛2(2𝛽+?̃?)[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?] ?̃? + 𝐷𝑖2𝛽+?̃?) (𝛾1 + 2𝛾2𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡)𝛿1⏟                                    "Level Effect" (+ if 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡∈ (0,− 𝛾12𝛾2); − if 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈ (− 𝛾12𝛾2,− 𝛾1𝛾2])+
             
{   
   2𝛾𝛽𝛽0𝛿1 (?̃?[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?](ℎ4𝑛0+ℎ5𝑛1+ℎ6𝑛2)(2𝛽+?̃?)2[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 + 𝐷𝑖(2𝛽+?̃?)2)+?̃?2𝛽𝛽0𝜙1 (𝑛−1)[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?](𝛼3𝑖+𝐷𝑖𝑐+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)(2𝛽+?̃?)2[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2+?̃?𝛽𝛽0𝜙1 [4𝛽2+(𝑛−1)?̃?2]∑ (𝛼3𝑗+𝐷𝑗𝑐+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗)𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖(2𝛽+?̃?)2[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 }   
   
⏟                                    "Elasticity Effect" (+/−)
             (B-16) 
 
In the above partial derivative, the sign of the “level effect” depends on the first derivative 
of the quadratic function of 𝛾 = 𝛾1𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡2 as shown by equation (4) in the 
paper (Gayle and Lin, 2020), which yields the following: 
(i) If 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈ (0, − 𝛾12𝛾2), there is a positive “level effect”; 
(ii) If 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈ (− 𝛾12𝛾2 , − 𝛾1𝛾2], there is a negative “level effect”. 
The sign of the “elasticity effect” depends on airlines’ hedging parameters, 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖. 
To determine the sign of the “elasticity effect”, we set it to zero and derive the condition on values 
of 𝛼3𝑖  and 𝛼−3𝑖. As such, we have the following: 2𝛾𝛽𝛽0𝛿1 (?̃?[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?](ℎ4𝑛0+ℎ5𝑛1+ℎ6𝑛2)(2𝛽+?̃?)2[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 + 𝐷𝑖(2𝛽+?̃?)2) +𝛽2𝛽𝛽0𝜙1 (𝑛−1)[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?](𝛼3𝑖+𝐷𝑖𝑐+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)(2𝛽+?̃?)2[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 +𝛽𝛽𝛽0𝜙1 [4𝛽2+(𝑛−1)?̃?2] ∑ (𝛼3𝑗+𝐷𝑗𝑐+𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗)𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖(2𝛽+?̃?)2[2𝛽−(𝑛−1)?̃?]2 = 0     (B-17) 
Appropriately rearranging equation B-17 yields: 
 𝛽(𝑛 − 1)[4𝛽 − (𝑛 − 2)𝛽]𝛼3𝑖′ + [4𝛽2 + (𝑛 − 1)𝛽2]𝛼−3𝑖′ =
− 1𝜙1?̃?{2𝛾𝛿1[2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽]2𝐷𝑖 + 2𝛾𝛿1?̃?[4𝛽 − (𝑛 − 2)𝛽](ℎ4𝑛0 + ℎ5𝑛1 + ℎ6𝑛2)+𝜙1𝛽2(𝑛 − 1)[4𝛽 − (𝑛 − 2)𝛽](𝐷𝑖𝑐 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖)+𝜙1𝛽[4𝛽2 + (𝑛 − 1)𝛽2]∑ (𝐷𝑗𝑐 + 𝛼7𝐼𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗)𝑛−1𝑗≠𝑖 }   (B-18) 
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Then define Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ , 𝛼−3𝑖′ ) ≡ 𝛽(𝑛 − 1)[4𝛽 − (𝑛 − 2)𝛽]𝛼3𝑖′ + [4𝛽2 + (𝑛 − 1)?̃?2]𝛼−3𝑖′ . 
According to Lemma 1, 2𝛽 − (𝑛 − 1)𝛽 ̃ > 0, and the fact that all other parameters of the right-
hand side of equation (B-18) are positive, therefore, Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ , 𝛼−3𝑖′ ) < 0.  
It is straightforward to conclude the following:  
(i) ∀𝑖 and values of 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 such that 𝛽(𝑛 − 1)[4𝛽 − (𝑛 − 2)𝛽]𝛼3𝑖 + [4𝛽2 + (𝑛 −1)𝛽2]𝛼−3𝑖 < Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ , 𝛼−3𝑖′ ), yield a negative “elasticity effect”;  
(ii) ∀𝑖 and values of 𝛼3𝑖 and 𝛼−3𝑖 such that 𝛽(𝑛 − 1)[4𝛽 − (𝑛 − 2)𝛽]𝛼3𝑖 + [4𝛽2 + (𝑛 −1)𝛽2]𝛼−3𝑖 > Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ , 𝛼−3𝑖′ ), yield a positive “elasticity effect”. 
Given the above relationships along with findings in Proposition 1, Table B2 summarizes 
the impact of market distance on the pass-through rate:    
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Table B2: The Impact of Market Distance on the Pass-through Rate2 
 Outcomes Parameter Restrictions 
𝑴𝒌𝒕_𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕∈ (𝟎,− 𝜸𝟏𝟐𝜸𝟐) 
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 
Level Effect> 0; Elasticity Effect< 0 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐}𝜕𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 either (+/−) 
(1.1) 𝛼3𝑖 < min {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ , Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ ,𝛼−3𝑖′ )−[4𝛽2+(𝑛−1)?̃?2]𝛼−3𝑖?̃?(𝑛−1)[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?] } 
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 
Level Effect> 0; Elasticity Effect> 0 𝜕 {𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 }𝜕𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 0 
(1.2) min {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ , Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ ,𝛼−3𝑖′ )−[4𝛽2+(𝑛−1)?̃?2]𝛼−3𝑖?̃?(𝑛−1)[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?] } <𝛼3𝑖 < max {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ , Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ ,𝛼−3𝑖′ )−[4𝛽2+(𝑛−1)?̃?2]𝛼−3𝑖?̃?(𝑛−1)[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?] } 
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 > 0 
Level Effect> 0; Elasticity Effect> 0 𝜕 {𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 }𝜕𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 0 
(1.3) 𝛼3𝑖 > max {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ , Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ ,𝛼−3𝑖′ )−[4𝛽2+(𝑛−1)?̃?2]𝛼−3𝑖?̃?(𝑛−1)[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?] } 
𝑴𝒌𝒕_𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕∈ (− 𝜸𝟏𝟐𝜸𝟐 , − 𝜸𝟏𝜸𝟐] 
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 
Level Effect< 0; Elasticity Effect< 0 𝜕 {𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 }𝜕𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 < 0 
(2.1) 𝛼3𝑖 < min {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ , Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ ,𝛼−3𝑖′ )−[4𝛽2+(𝑛−1)?̃?2]𝛼−3𝑖?̃?(𝑛−1)[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?] } 
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 
Level Effect< 0; Elasticity Effect> 0 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐}𝜕𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 either (+/−) 
(2.2) min {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ , Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ ,𝛼−3𝑖′ )−[4𝛽2+(𝑛−1)?̃?2]𝛼−3𝑖?̃?(𝑛−1)[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?] } <𝛼3𝑖 < max {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ , Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ ,𝛼−3𝑖′ )−[4𝛽2+(𝑛−1)?̃?2]𝛼−3𝑖?̃?(𝑛−1)[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?] } 
𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 > 0 
Level Effect< 0; Elasticity Effect> 0 𝜕{𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐}𝜕𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 either (+/−) 
(2.3) 𝛼3𝑖 > max {Θ(𝛼3𝑖∗ ,𝛼−3𝑖∗ )−?̃?𝛼−3𝑖2𝛽−(𝑛−2)𝛽 ̃ , Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ ,𝛼−3𝑖′ )−[4𝛽2+(𝑛−1)?̃?2]𝛼−3𝑖?̃?(𝑛−1)[4𝛽−(𝑛−2)?̃?] } 
                                                     
2
 For conditions (1.2) and (2.2), we find the signs of  𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 and its partial derivatives with respect to market distance are 
opposite with two possibilities; however, assuming the pass-through equation to be a continuous and differentiable 
function with respect to market distance, the only possibility is 𝜕𝑃𝑖∗𝜕𝑃𝑐 < 0 and the relevant partial derivatives are positive, 
as shown in the table. 
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From Table B2, 𝛼3𝑖′ , 𝛼−3𝑖′  are the critical values such that the “elasticity effect” is zero. Therefore, Λ(𝛼3𝑖′ , 𝛼−3𝑖′ ) identifies the threshold of fuel hedging adoptions by airlines that determines whether 
the “elasticity effect” portion of the marginal impact of market distance on the crude oil-airfare 
pass-through rate is positive or negative.  
 Based on parameter restrictions and associated outcomes reported in Table B2, we 
summarize the impact of market distance on the crude oil-airfare pass-through rate in Proposition 
5: 
 
Proposition 5: The impact of market distance between the origin and destination on the pass-
through from changes in crude oil price to airfare is governed by two effects: “level effect” and 
“elasticity effect”. Furthermore, the “elasticity effect” depends crucially on consumers’ differing 
sensitivities to changes in airfare across markets of differing distances, as well as the airline’s and 
its rival airlines’ fuel hedging strategies:  
(i) when 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈ (0,− 𝛾12𝛾2) and airline 𝑖’s hedging ratio is at a level satisfying (1.1) 
in Table B2, a positive “level effect” counters a negative “elasticity effect”, and the 
overall impact of market distance on the negative pass-through rate depends on the 
relative strengths of the two countervailing effects;  
(ii) when 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈ (0,− 𝛾12𝛾2) and airline 𝑖’s hedging ratio is at a level satisfying (1.2) 
in Table B2, a positive “level effect” reinforces a positive “elasticity effect”, 
strengthening the overall positive impact of market distance on the negative pass-
through rate. Specifically, the negative pass-through rate increases toward 0 (i.e. 
decreasing in magnitude) with longer market distances; 
(iii) when 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈ (0,− 𝛾12𝛾2) and airline 𝑖’s hedging ratio is at a level satisfying (1.3) 
in Table B2, a positive “level effect” reinforces a positive “elasticity effect”, 
strengthening the overall positive impact of market distance on the positive pass-
through rate. Specifically, the positive pass-through rate increases away from 0 (i.e. 
increasing in magnitude) with longer market distances; 
(iv) when 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈ (− 𝛾12𝛾2 , − 𝛾1𝛾2] and airline 𝑖’s hedging ratio is at a level satisfying 
(2.1) in Table B2, a negative “level effect” reinforces a negative “elasticity effect”, 
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strengthening the overall negative impact of market distance on the negative pass-
through rate. Specifically, the negative pass-through rate further decreases away from 
0 (i.e. increasing in magnitude) with longer market distances; 
(v) when 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈ (− 𝛾12𝛾2 , − 𝛾1𝛾2] and airline 𝑖’s hedging ratio is at a level satisfying (2.2) 
in Table B2, a negative “level effect” counters a positive “elasticity effect”, the overall 
impact of market distance on the negative pass-through rate depends on the relative 
strengths of the two countervailing effects; 
(vi) when 𝑀𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∈ (− 𝛾12𝛾2 , − 𝛾1𝛾2] and airline 𝑖’s hedging ratio is at a level satisfying 
(2.3) in Table B2, a negative “level effect” counters a positive “elasticity effect”, the 
overall impact of market distance on the positive pass-through rate depends on the 
relative strengths of the two countervailing effects. 
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